Natural Law Demythologized A Functional Theory of Norms for a Revolutionary Epoch by Roberts, E. F.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 51
Issue 4 Summer 1966 Article 2
Natural Law Demythologized A Functional Theory
of Norms for a Revolutionary Epoch
E. F. Roberts
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
E. F. Roberts, Natural Law Demythologized A Functional Theory of Norms for a Revolutionary Epoch , 51 Cornell L. Rev. 656 (1966)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol51/iss4/2
NATURAL LAW DEMYTHOLOGIZED: A
FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF NORMS
FOR A REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH
E. F. Robertst
Jurisprudence can afford us some insight into whether a particular system
is functioning effectively. To do this jurisprudes must extrapolate the aims
of the society and then evaluate how efficiently its legal system functions
to structure social activity so that those aims are realized in an orderly
fashion. Jurisprudence is seen, therefore, to be a form of time and motion
study on a grand scale. Judgments about the ultimate worth of a given
society's aims are excluded from jurisprudence, however, on the ground
that suck emotionally charged and ethically relative conclusions cannot
be proved by any empirically verifiable scale of values.
This article does not purport to set forth any accurate mirror image
of reality. It does formulate a way of looking at some value problems
as they arise in law and society. Some will find this view to be anathema
and, hopefully, others will find that it accords with their own feelings
toward these phenomena. This is necessarily so, because in dealing with
ultimate value systems we are entering a realm where emotions rule the
day. We are not dealing in the realm of reason: we are appealing to feel-
ings, and only for those whose feelings are similar are we engaged in
ratiocination. This essay, then, is like a symphony which, if its major
theme strikes a responsive chord, the balance of its message appears
reasonably to fall into place. If its opening movement does not appeal,
however, the rapport necessary for meaningful communication has never
been created and there is no more to be said.
I
INTRODUCTION
Practical needs and our vital and psychic economy demand absolute (i.e.,
unqualified) answers, and make us cling to what sounds or seems to us
simple.* 1
All of us, or so I suspect, tend to regard "time" and "distance" as
constants. True, when is is 10:00 A.M. in Ithaca, New York, it is 2:00
P.M. in Nottingham, England, but an hour remains a decent sixty min-
t A.B. 1952, Northeastern University; LL.B. 1954, Boston College. Professor of Law,
Cornell University.
* A footnote to these footnotes is in order. These notes are not designed to prove the
statements to which they are affixed since it is the author's contention that their proof lies in
each reader's reflections upon his own experiences in the world. The notes do refer to sources
and they often cite diverging lines of inquiry. Perhaps they are best described as a counter-
point to the major theme.
1 Cohen, Reason and Law 64-65 (1950).
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ute interval and a yard measure stays a proper three feet long in both
climes. Like Major Blimp, I can't help but think these concepts are fun-
damental because it is in terms of them that I order the rest of my exist-
ence. The very suggestion that what to me is an hour might appear to
be an hour and a quarter in Nottingham, or that my yardstick might
look like only three quarters of its length from there, causes me to doubt
either my own sanity or, more likely, the sanity of whomsoever should
suggest such nonsense. Nonetheless, some phenomena in physics must
give me chance to pause.
Taking advantage of the age in which we live, let us posit a rocket,
the length of a football field, hurtling through space at three-fifths of the
velocity of light. From a space platform, presuming it to be stationary
for a moment, the rocket will measure only eighty yards long. If a space-
man on the platform were to hold a rod, which to him measures fifteen
feet, parallel with the path of the rocket's flight, an observer on the
rocket will calculate that the rod measures only some twelve feet long.
Even allowing for the time the light rays needed to pass between the
quickly separating objects, a perceptible retardation in time would still
remain. An hour of life on the rocket would appear to the platform
dweller to be an hour and a quarter, and, conversely, to the rocketeer an
hour of life of the platform dweller would appear to be proportionately
longer.2
Similarly, all of us once managed to come to some rough appreciation
of molecules and atoms by visualizing bits of matter arranged like those
models in elementary text books. Disturbingly one discovers that the
idea of the atom as the basic building block has given way to the idea of
sub-atomic particles, until even the "reality" of these particles has dis-
solved. That is:
[T]he atom of modern physics can be symbolized only through a partial
differential equation in an abstract space of many dimensions.... All its
qualities are inferential; no material properties can be directly attributed
to it. That is to say, any picture of the atom that our imagination is able
to invent is for that very reason defective. An understanding of the atomic
world is that primary sensuous fashion . . . is impossible.3
2 Einstein, Relativity 135-36 (Lawson transl. 1947): "We already know from our previous
discussion that the behavior of measuring-rods and docks is influenced by gravitational fields,
i.e., by the distribution of matter. This in itself is sufficient to exclude the possibility of the
exact validity of Euclidean geometry in our universe.. . . Such a universe might fittingly be
called a quasi-Euclidean universe." For a verbal approach to this material, see Russell, The
ABC of Relativity 33 (Mentor ed. 1959). For anyone with some recollection of mathematics,
an excellent little book is Durell, Readable Relativity (Harper ed. 1960).
3 Heisenberg, "Zur Geschichte der physikalischen Naturerklrirung," quoted in Cassirer,
"The Goals and Methods of Theoretical Physics," Philosophy of Knowledge: Selected Read-
ings 245, 278-79 (Houde & Mullally ed. 1960).
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And, of course, while statistical analysis of atomic behavior has become
commonplace, the behavior of single units of energy still successfully
escape prediction.'
I must admit to myself that my ideas about "time" or of "distance"
do not necessarily reflect any universal truth. My picture of the atom is
hopelessly naive. In point of fact, my concepts of time and distance are
not mirror images of reality but are mental constructs or concepts im-
posed on the world by me. It is in these terms that I order the world
around me, but I must pause before I jump to the conclusion that the
world necessarily conforms to my picture of it. I may, in fact, have to
admit that my ways of looking at the world are merely hypotheses and
that, while I can order my affairs in terms of these ideas, order may not
exist in the world of things outside of my mind.5
Certainty erodes still further when I realize that man exists as a dis-
tinct species only in terms of his consciousness. The first and most ob-
vious distinguishing characteristic of man is his capacity for abstract
ideation. A wit put it very aptly when he commented that man is dis-
4 These intriguing phenomena in the vast reaches of space and inside the atom bring to
mind Pascal's description of man's disproportion. Pascal, Pensees, Fragment 72 (Everyman
ed. 1948):
Let man then contemplate. ... Let him gaze on that brilliant light, set like an eternal
lamp to illuminate the universe; let the earth appear to him a point in comparison with
the vast circle described by the sun; and let him wonder at the fact that this vast circle
is itself but a very fine point in comparison with that described by the stars in their
revolution round the firmament. . . . The whole visible world is only an imperceptible
atom in the ample bosom of nature. No idea approaches it ...
But to show him another prodigy equally astonishing, let him examine the most
delicate things he knows. .... Perhaps he will think that here is the smallest point in
nature. I will let him see therein a new abyss. I will paint for him ... all that he can
conceive of nature's immensity in the womb of this abridged atom. Let him see therein
an infinity of universes, each of which has its firmament, its planets, its earth ....
5 See Holmes, "John Marshall," in Collected Legal Papers 266, 270 (1920): "We live by
symbols, and what shall be symbolized by any image of the sight depends upon the mind of
him who sees it." Compare Lewis, Mind and the World Order 29-30 (Dover ed. 1956): "The
world of experience is not given in experience: it is constructed by thought from the data of
sense. This reality which everybody knows reflects the structure of human intelligence as
much as it does the nature of the independently given sensory content;" Montagu, Man in
Process 73 (Mentor ed. 1962): "The law and order that man sees in Nature he introduces
there, a fact of which he seems to have grown quite unconscious. Natural systems of classi-
fication work so well that, following an unconscious pragmatic principle, they are assumed
to be true . .. ."
This particular approach finds itself reflected in the poetry of Wallace Stevens, particularly
in the "Idea of Order at Key West," Whiher & Ahnebrink, Twelve American Poets 107
(Oxford ed. 1961). "A final clue to Stevens .... The world we inhabit is one we 'half
create'; we make the order we perceive." Id. at 100. For an interesting diversion read in
conjunction with Stevens the following dictum from T. E. Hulme: "Why is it that London
looks pretty by night? Because for the general cindery chaos there is substituted a simple
ordered arrangement of a finite number of lights." Hulme, Speculations 221 (Routledge ed.
1960). Consider also that the same author put forth the ideas that: "The aim of science and
of all thought is to reduce the complex and inevitable disconnected world of grit and cinders
to a few ideal counters, which we can move about and so form an ungritlike picture of
reality-one flattering to our sense of power over the world." Id. at 224; and "animals are
in the same state that men were before symbolic language was invented." Id. at 229.
[Vol. 51
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tinguished from animals by his ability at lying and literature. In a sense
this is true because man is a symbol-functioning creature, language and
its verbal concepts having become interposed between his reactor and
effector-systems.' As a result, while an animal lives in harmony with
nature, man no longer reacts to phenomena about him first hand; the
medium of language and his self-awareness interject themselves. Epicte-
tus rightly observed that what alarms man are not things, but his opin-
ions and fancies about them. The key to understanding his struggles is
a realization that each man seeks a system of mental orientation adequate
to the facts he encounters in everyday life. There is a good deal of truth,
therefore, in the assertion that "man exists in a world of his own crea-
tion.27
There is a point, moreover, to the Kantian idea that the human mind
is able to orient itself to raw phenomena about it because inherent in
the mind itself is a certain scheme of classification. It would now appear,
however, that this basic postulational matrix is relative to the particular
society in which the mind is trained. While "time" to Kant was a priori,
we now believe that time, as an organizing device, is relative to particu-
lar societies.' The very basic ideas which are the starting point of knowl-
edge-the "animal, vegetable or mineral" components seemingly inherent
in the mind-are merely the product of the culture in terms of which
the child is reared so that the way a person comes to understand his
environment is relative. Thus, "the picture of the universe shifts from
tongue to tongue."9
The real difficulty with the study of jurisprudence is that there is no
"legal system" in any society. What passes for the legal system is only
a high-level abstraction, a hypothetical average of individual outlooks
about the legal system held by members of the society. That this sub-
jective atomization does not lead to chaos is testimony to the fact that
6 See, Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience 108-12 (1959).
7 Johnson, A Treatise on Language 29 (U. Cal. Press ed. 1959). "Language usurps thus,
to an astonishing extent, the dignity which truly belongs to creation. I know we usually say
that words are signs for things. Practically, we make things the signs of words." Id. at 40.
8 Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality 57-58 (M.I.T. ed. 1964):
After long and careful study and analysis, the Hopi language is seen to contain no words,
grammatical forms, constructions or expressions that refer directly to what we call
At the same time, the Hopi language is capable of accounting for and describing cor-
rectly, in a pragmatic or operational sense, all observable phenomena of the universe.
. .. Just as it is possible to have any number of geometries other than the Euclidean
which give an equally perfect account of space configurations, so it is possible to have
descriptions of the universe, all equally valid, that do not contain our familiar contrasts
of time and space. The relativity viewpoint of modern physics is one such view, conceived
in mathematical terms, and the Hopi Weltanschauung is another and quite different one,
nonmathematical and linguistic.
9 Id. at vi (foreword by Chase).
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the mental outlooks of the constituents of any society have been formu-
lated by reference to the same set of mental constructs which pass as the
"Uculture" of the society. Indeed, the apparently objective legal system
is in reality the accidental by-product of the more or less uniform mental
constructs which have been transmitted to its constituents by the commun-
ity's educational processes. Their remarkably similar subjective concept-
ualization about the legal system is, therefore, inevitable."
Men do possess a system of logic, but its actual use is much more lim-
ited than the educational organs of the society care to, or can admit."
This is so because most basic ideas are not propositions, as the term is
understood in logic, but are in fact propositional functions. That is, while
the statement of an idea appears to be a proposition in form, its content
is such that it is not one in fact, because it contains high-level abstrac-
tions susceptible to a wide variety of meanings. It is so variable as to be
empirically meaningless standing by itself. Thus, "All men are created
equal" is not a proposition and is, therefore, neither a true nor a false
statement. "Men" may mean white or colored, or both; adult or child,
or both; or citizen or foreigner, or both. "Equal" may include "before
God," "before the courts of law," "in size or shape," "in intelligence,"
etc. Until the variables are replaced by specific items susceptible to vali-
dation by empirical methods, it will be seen that the statement can have
only emotional significance; it sums up a particular way of ordering the
cosmos around the observer. 2
If one stops to think about it, geometry is premised upon several fun-
damental propositions which are tautological and, perforce, are neither
true nor false but simply given.3 Once these basic axioms are accepted
1o See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Opinion in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 596 (1940): "The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive
sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which may
serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generation,
and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civiliza-
tion. 'We live by symbols.'"
Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age 110 (Anchor ed. 1957): "Man is not what he is solely
by virtue of biological inheritance, but also, and much more, thanks to what tradition makes
him.... Through ... purposive education to which he is subjected ... he acquires... his
culture, which becomes for him, so to say, his second nature."
11 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," supra note 5, at 167, 180: "The fallacy to which I
refer is the notion that the only force at work in the development of the law is logic;"
Phillips, Felix Frankfurter Reminisces 10 (1960): "[Scholars] . . .haven't learned how
much in this world is determined by nonsyllogistic reasoning, or without conscious exploration
of a problem with a view to reaching a logical conclusion."
12 See, particularly, Keyser, "The Nature of the Doctrinal Function and Its Role in Ra-
tional Thought," 41 Yale L.J. 713 (1932).
13 Einstein, supra note 2, at 2:
A proposition is then correct ("true") when it has been derived in the recognized manner
from the axioms. The question of the "truth" of the individual geometrical propositions
is thus reduced to the "truth" of the axioms. Now it has long been known that the last
question is not oniy unanswerable by the methods of geometry, but that it is in itself
entirely without meaning. We cannot ask whether it is true that only one straight line
[Vol. 51
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as "self-evident" and the balance of the system logically deduced there-
from, a "rational" description of affairs is created. Similarly, any legal
system is deduced and developed rationally from a limited set of basic
axioms. Yet these fundamental axioms are again neither true nor false,
in this instance because they are so hopelessly vague that they escape
validation. These self-evident truths are accepted because they afford
the observer an orientation which appears to him, at his particular time
and place, to be an adequate explanation and ordering of the facts of
existence. Being neither true nor false, the attachment to these basic




The products of social life, which may be conveniently summed up in the
label "culture," are inventions.'5
In primitive society, in order for the species to survive, an accommo-
dation had to be made with the world as it was. In order for the tribe
to function, arrangements had to be made for, inter alia, the sharing of
political power, the distribution of wealth, the organization of the family,
modes of sexual conduct, and the methods of settling intra-societal dis-
putes. Since there were innumerable alternatives available for the han-
dling of each problem, it was inevitable that the doctrine of chance, even
apart from the accident of environment, made it impossible that any two
tribes would settle on exactly the same set of expedients. Variety then
was the most obvious phenomenon of primitive society."
goes through two points. We can only say that Euclidean geometry deals with things
called "straight lines," to each of which is ascribed the property of being uniquely de-
termined by two points situated on it. The concept "true" does not tally with the asser-
tions of pure geometry, because by the word "true" we are eventually in the habit of
designating always the correspondence with a "real" object; geometry, however, is not
concerned with the relation of the ideas involved in it to objects of experience, but only
with the logical connection of these ideas among themselves.
14 Haskins, Of Societies and Men 206 (Compass ed. 1960):
How far such mental specialization of the individual to his culture society has gone, and
how markedly the culture society takes on the typical aspect of an integrated organiza-
tion in this regard, is brought vividly home when one reflects on how difficult it is to
accept a radical change in one's cultural milieu when it concerns elements which are
regarded as vital. Every great war has demonstrated that there are many millions of
human beings who would prefer death to a compulsory shift of this sort.
15 Cairns, The Theory of Legal Science 53 (1941).
16 For a succinct statement of this variety, see Goble, "The Mutability of Law," 11 Hast-
ings L.J. 95, 101-02 (1950):
Among many groups human sacrifice was widespread. It was a breach of filial duty for
Eskimo children to fail to kill their parents when they became useless because of age.
Infanticide was practiced with children who were born crippled or diseased, or even with
those born during stormy weather or during certain times of the year, or when the par-
ents already had a specified number of offspring. At various times and among many
groups polygamy, polyandry or complete promiscuity between the sexes was practiced.
1966]
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Exactly how the primitive tribes formulated their accord with the
universe remains, and probably will continue to remain, an enigma.1
7
That the tribe formulated at a primitive town-meeting some form of
"social contract" seems quite unlikely. But as a propositional function
akin to an axiom of geometry, the theory of the social contract has
afforded a point at which to begin the examination of the idea of the
state as a mechanism of society."8 The existence of the state when history
begins can be explained as if men had gotten together to formulate such
a compact. As a matter of history, however, we can only surmise that
certain ways of going about doing the things necessary to social existence
were hit upon by accident and became habitual with primitive folk.
Once a particular solution did become habitual, however, the process
of language began to operate upon the society. Even primitive societies
were more than a mere aggregation of creatures interacting: the very
Frequently these practices turned upon the relative number of men and women in the
group. In some tribes groups of men collectively married groups of women. Monogamy
was sometimes looked upon as shameful, apparently on the theory that it was wrong for
a man to have a monopoly of one woman. In patriarchal systems wives were slaves of
their husbands. Marriage by purchase prevailed in many areas. In some places women
would sell themselves to raise money for temples and other philanthropic causes. Among
some tribes virginity among girls was held in contempt. Chastity was relatively a late
development in society. In some localities it was regarded as inhospitable for a host not
to offer his wife or daughter to his guest as a companion for the night, and it was an
insult to the lady if the offer was refused. Cannibalism was almost universal among
primitive tribes, and slavery was widely recognized and approved. Among some groups
parents sold their children into slavery. Mutilation of the human body, especially of the
ears, nose, lips and teeth was regarded as proper, and sometimes required even by the
most advanced primitive peoples, until as recently as 15,000 years ago. In many groups
certain persons became untouchable, or were to be shunned because they were "tabu."
Trickery, deception, dishonesty, greed, cruelty and violence were not only approved of,
but they were regarded as indispensable to survival. "Primitive man," says Durant, "was
cruel because he had to be." Almost every vice that one can think of was once a virtue.
17 Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems 5 (1940): "We do not consider that
the origins of primitive institutions can be discovered and, therefore, we do not think that it
is worth while seeking for them;" Times, May 12, 1961 (Literary Supp.), p. 290, col. 5: "We
can investigate, though still with great difficulty, the theology of the Nuer, for they can tell
us what they believe and can give some explanation of the rites they perform. But in the
case of prehistoric man such direct and indispensable communication is irretrievably lost,
and concerning his gods we 'know,' and can know, absolutely nothing."
18 Cassirer, The Myth of the State 218 (Anchor ed. 1955):
The objects of geometry must be constructed in order to be fully understood. Obviously
this constructive act is a mental, not a temporal process. What we are looking for is an
origin in reason, not in time. We try to analyze geometrical objects into their first
elements and reconstruct them by a synthetic process of thought. The same principle
holds for political objects. If Hobbes describes the transition from the natural to the
social state, he is not interested in the empirical origin of the state. The point at issue
is not the history but the "validity" of the social and political order. What matters
alone is not the historical but the legal basis of the state; and it is the question of this
legal basis that is answered by the theory of the social contract.
Hoebel, The Laws of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics 276 (1954):
No culture has a specific starting point in time; yet in the operation of the first function
it is as though men were getting together and saying to each other, "Look here! Let's
have a little organization here or we'll never get anywhere with this mess! Let's have a
clear understanding of who's who, what we are to do, and how we are going to do it!"




idea of a human society signifies that it is made up of sentient creatures
who communicate their ways to each other and to succeeding generations.
Once society evolved man ceased to be an instinctive animal; his capaci-
ties became learned ones. 9 Indeed, what is distinctive about human so-
ciety is the very fact that it is based upon symbolic communication. Man
perforce exists in a physical world, but he lives in a symbolic one. Once
such a society is posited, moreover, man knows nothing except through
linguistic symbols. Each society entertains a process whereby its statis-
tically most frequent methods become mores, i.e., norms become norma-
tive with verbal transmission from generation to generation. "Cousins
do not intermarry here" with time becomes "Cousins ought not inter-
marry" and finally "Cousins shall not intermarry." Order then seems to
have originated out of crystallized conduct, the description taking on the
quality of a command. 0
The influence of this verbal order on man cannot be emphasized too
much. "Language is cardinal in rearing human young, in organizing
human communities, in handing down the culture from generation to
generation."' At all levels,, thinking depends on language. Simple, indi-
vidual conduct, for example, is inextricably interwoven with verbal
forms. People behave more carelessly near what are called "empty"
gasoline drums than near what are called gasoline drums, even though
the explosive vapors contained in the former make them more danger-
ous.22 In organizing a project on the grand scale of a TVA, aid has had
to be channeled in terms of "loans" rather than in terms of "gifts" lest
the local mores be offended and the whole plan falter.' In point of fact
19 See Berger & Kellner, "Arnold Gehlen and the Theory of Institutions," 32 Social Research
110 (1965).
20 Hoebel, supra note 18, at 15: "In society what 'is' takes on the compulsive element of
'ought.' 'The folkways are the "right" ways.' The norm takes on the quality of the norma-
tive. What the most do, others should do."
21 Whorf, supra note 8, at vi (foreword by Chase).
22 Id. at 135:
Thus around a storage of what are called "gasoline drums," behavior will tend to a
certain type, that is, great care will be exercised; while around a storage of what are
called "empty gasoline drums," it will tend to be different--careless, with little repres-
sion of smoking or of tossing cigarette stubs about. Yet the "empty" drums are perhaps the
more dangerous, since they contain explosive vapor. Physically the situation is hazardous,
but the linguistic analysis according to regular analogy must employ the word "empty,"
which inevitably suggests lack of hazard.
23 Arnold, The Symbols of Government 16 (1935):
The Tennessee Valley Authority is conducting a great experiment in the utilization of
power by government for the benefit of a large number of poverty-stricken people. The
direct way would be to furnish the power to the people and to give them the equipment
with which to make it useful. In effect this is what is being attempted, but it must be
accompanied by the most elaborate make-believe.... Yet the complicated make-believe
by which this is accomplished is, curiously enough, not for the benefit of the purchasers
who are unable to understand it . . . but for the moral comfort of others who would




almost all human conduct and social activity occurs in the arena of
verbal forms.
As a pattern of culture develops, therefore, behavioral patterns undergo
a metamorphosis and become themselves order through the agency of
verbal forms. Norms, once crystallized, become a cultural matrix which
typifies and sets apart the society from other societies. Since the details
of conduct of each society differ, it is obvious that the verbalized norms
derived from these patterns of conduct will differ. And as the more in-
telligent, or at least the more intellectually inclined, elders in the com-
munity begin to summarize their accumulated "wisdom" of the tribe, in
order to transmit it, an abstracting process seems naturally to occur.
The very nature of the educational process required that first principles,
or basic norms, be ferreted out and succinctly stated. In time a body of
"self-evident truths" grew up, a body of doctrine sacred to the tribe.
This matrix then becomes a conservative force in society, channeling
future conduct into conformity with its precepts. In short, "ideas restrain
and canalize the lusts of men."24 Indeed, it is fair to observe that, com-
monly, "even the most radical member of a community is, and cannot
help being, in the greater part of his convictions in accordance with the
basic presuppositions of the social order of his community rather than in
rebellion against it."2
Within a society, therefore, the postulates or "self-evident truths"
provide a Weltanschauung orienting people to the flux around them.
Postulates necessarily must be found, because the sanity of the human
mind seems to depend upon belief in some supposedly rational ordering
of the phenomena about it. 26 Most men cannot afford to withstand the
irritation of doubt for any appreciable length of time. As a mental con-
struct, i.e., a postulate as opposed to a valid psychological principle, there
is much to be said for Jerome Frank's description of the law in terms of
a search for a father-image.2 7
24 Weigel, Faith and Understanding in America 21 (1959).
25 Nekam, The Personality Conception of Legal Entity 4 (1938).
26 Cohen, A Preface to Logic 15 (1944): "We all need some ground from which to start
and on which to light after our short swallow flights of doubt and critical reflection."
27 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 19 (Anchor ed. 1963): "That is, the desire persists in
grown men to recapture, through a rediscovery of a father, a childish, completely controllable
universe, and that desire seeks satisfaction in a partial, unconscious, anthropomorphizing of
Law, in ascribing to the Law some of the characteristics of the child's Father-Judge." Later,
Frank asks: "Why do men seek unrealizable certainty in law? Because, we reply, they have
not yet relinquished the childish need for an authoritative father and unconsciously have
tried to find in the law a substitute for those attributes of firmness, sureness, certainty and
infallibility ascribed in childhood to the father." Id. at 22.
Frank himself very carefully observed that this was but one cause of the urge to find
certainty in the law. See Rumble, "Jerome Frank and His Critics: Certainty and Fantasy
in the judicial Process," 10 J. Pub. L. 125, 126-27 (1961).
[Vol. 5 1
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Belief is the absence of doubt.2s Indeed, most persons never have rea-
son to doubt the self-evident truths of their particular society, and their
acquired orientation to the world suffices. Professor Nekam has observed
that "this tendency of man to regard the values he accepts, the set of
conditions he is familiar with, as absolute and the only natural ones
seems to be one of the basic phenomena of social life."2 9 It is here, in
fact, that the key to the legal system is to be found. Rather than derive
its sanction from the state, or from force at all, the law ultimately de-
rives its effectiveness from the very fact that, as Professor Fuller has
stated it, the law "imperceptibly becomes a part of men's common be-
liefs, and exercises a frictionless control over their activities which de-
rives its sanction not from its source but from a conviction of its essen-
tial rightness."80
III
CHANGE IN THE LAW
To be sure, these man-made structures can never be as firm as those of the
animal world. They must be continuously produced and re-produced in
human activity. As a result, they are inherently precarious and predestined
to change. 1
Under normal conditions, a legal system will maintain its predomin-
ant characteristics over a period of generations. In its details, however,
change is a constant activity. The evolution of a new technology, the
shift to a new form of commercial enterprise, an altered equilibrium in
the class structure, a radical demographic shift-all these must result in
changes in the legal system which purports realistically to regulate so-
ciety.
Any system of social science, including law, tends, of course, to be
stated in an oversimplified manner. Mr. Justice Cardozo's exclamation
that "they can do this better with logarithms" accurately depicts the
28 This, of course, is a thesis of Charles S. Peirce. See his "The Fixation of Belief,"
originally published in 12 Pop. Sci. Mo., Nov., 1877, p. 1, reprinted in Values in a Universe
of Chance 91-112 (Anchor ed. 1958).
29 Nekam, supra note 25, at 6; see Montagu, supra note 5; Shepard, "Law and Obedience,"
33 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 783, 798-99 (1939):
Wener holds that a "dominant need projects certain stimulus-objects into metaphysical
absolute-higher laws, which are believed to be objectively true." . . . Certainly in-
dividuals manifest a remarkably persistent feeling of necessity to act, in Vaihinger's
pregnant sense, "as if" such a standard does exist, as a beacon illuminating the pathway
to a dim and far-off event.
30 Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 134 (1940). Compare Shepard, supra note 29; see
Olivecrona, Law as Fact 17 (1939): "The 'binding force' of the law is a reality merely as an
idea in human minds. There is nothing in the outside world which corresponds to this idea."
See also Hoebel, supra note 18, at 181, where the author criticizes Malinowski because "the
reader is definitely given to believe that law operates without the aid of physical force, al-
though it does bind behavior." But see Northrop, supra note 6, at 97-101.
81 Berger & Kellner, supra note 19, at 112.
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practical situation. Simple sentences and cause-and-effect reasoning do
not accurately mirror phenomena functioning in extremely complex sys-
tems of mutually dependent variables. In any human situation, even the
simplest, there are more variables than the human mind can properly
take into account. The reality must be more complex than any verbal
statement about it. Consequently, an element of uncertainty must persist
in respect to what verbal statement will be applied in a given situation.
"And how could this well be otherwise?" asked Jerome Frank. "The law
deals with human relations in their most complicated aspects."3" But
because the law is uncertain-each person's idea of it differing in its de-
tails-the system is flexible enough to allow for change.
A reformer concluding that a certain detail no longer works effectively
to achieve a certain end may believe he is being properly pragmatic in
suggesting a change. In fact his proposed modification is meaningless
unless it is put into the context of his perception of the society's self-
evident truths and his philosophy of how they should be achieved. 3 And,
in order to have the change adopted, the reformer must convince persons
of influence in the society that it will better effectuate the society's ends.
The change, however, as Professor Nekam insists, must inevitably be
effectuated by manipulating verbal forms in order to persuade the so-
ciety that the proposal is "more just," "fairer," "better" than the old
rule.84 Indeed, while man may be a symbol-functioning creature, unique
32 Frank, supra note 27, at 6.
33 Not even a minute detail of law exists in a vacuum, since the value to be attributed
to it depends upon the context in which it is used. This is also true, for example, in physics.
Cassirer, supra note 3, at 275:
What a physicist gives as the outcome of an experiment is not a report on the isolated
facts that he has ascertained but an interpretation of these facts, or in other words their
transposition into an ideal, abstract, symbolic world constructed on theories that he
regards as established. A law of physics is a symbolic relationship, whose application to
concrete reality demands a knowledge of a whole system of theories which one assumes
to be valid.
This phenomenon found reflection in anthropological research into the legal systems of
primitive peoples. See, e.g., Northrop, supra note 6, at 36:
After many years of such observing and the writing of scientific reports, a few anthro-
pologists suddenly awoke to the fact that they had been misunderstanding the facts
which they observed and described. They discovered, moreover, that this occurred
because they had been describing and conceiving of what they saw the native people
doing in concepts brought to the observed facts by the anthropologist himself, instead
of in the way these facts were thought of and, hence, understood and ordered by the
native people.
Whorf, supra note 8, at 58: "Thus, the Hopi language and culture conceals a Metaphysics,
such as our so-called naive view of space and time does, or as the relativity theory does;
yet it is a different metaphysics from either."
34 Nekam, supra note 25, at 4:
[W]hen for reasons peculiar to him man comes to consider certain parts of the accepted
legal order as unjust or oppressive, as outgrown or unreasonable-it is again not merely
because of the seeming expedience of a proposed rule or institution that he accepts and
advocates it, but rather because of his personal conviction that the new conception is
the one which is natural, obvious, and absolute, and that that of the community is based
either on misunderstanding, prejudice, or usurpation of power. And we find that his
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because of his capacity for propositional language, the basic stratum of
his thinking is still the language of emotions.
IV
A FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF Noips
The problem of law's nature is tremendously complex, and if a few cate-
gories and definitions are here hesitatingly advanced, that is because no
analysis is possible otherwise.3 5
Assuming the material just stated reflects in some degree social phe-
nomena, it remains to be seen whether a system of order can be imposed
on these sundry factors, a matrix which will afford a plausible explana-
tion of the functioning of norms within the legal order. Such a theory, it
must be remembered, is itself a mental construct, an effort to impose
order on chaos. The theory neither purports to be exhaustive, nor does
it purport to describe accurately every detail of legal phenomena. It is
offered merely as a vehicle which may provide some insight into the exis-
tential situation.
Function of the Establishment. The basic task of the establishment 8
ideally is to channel the activity within a society into orderly modes
whereby drives and forces within the society can attain peaceful realiza-
tion. The legal system contains one set of forms which the establishment
may manipulate to maintain order, but there are other devices available.
Instead of regulating the market-place, for example, the establishment
may choose to allow commercial activity to seek its own level according
to "immutable laws" of the market-place. Instead of legislating a system
of morality the establishment may see fit to rely upon the religious con-
victions current in the community, leaving the function of channeling
them to the persuasive talents of churches. In order to encourage a policy
of thrift as part of an austerity program, the leaders of the establishment
themselves may choose to persuade, by setting an example to be emu-
lated, rather than to legislate a new economic program. It will be seen
therefore, that the devices available to the establishment operating in a
political arena include more than the legal forms.
The most fundamental fact in the nature of government, of course, is
success as a reformer will be limited to the degree in which he succeeds in awakening in
others the same feeling.
85 Shepard, supra note 29, at 783.
86 1 use the word "establishment" rather than "government" so as to include those persons,
groups, and classes who effectively share in the actual process of governmental decision-
making and in influencing decision-making. In the Soviet Union, of course, it is obvious that
the Communist Party is the establishment. In the United States the establishment includes,
among others, the decision-makers of both political parties, the leaders of the largest indus-
trial corporations, and the owners of the major news media. The word is a variable, but I
think the idea behind it is essentially obvious.
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that whoever it is, the establishment wants to remain in power. Part and
parcel of its desire to remain in power is a manifest interest in maintain-
ing order in the community. To maintain order without resorting to force,
however, the establishment must function within the established sym-
bolic forms of the community: it must not shatter the illusion that the
existent forms are universal "rightways." Any changes it makes in the de-
tails of the formal patterns of conduct in the community must be made
after carefully persuading the constituents of the community that the
change more efficiently realizes the goals set forth in the society's matrix
of self-evident truths. In turn, it must change the formal or positive law
to reflect evolving patterns of conduct in such a way that the law itself
appears to remain, not a whim of the establishment, but a reflection of
immutable norms. The establishment's problem on the purely domestic
scene, therefore, is to maintain a dynamic equilibrium of order-at once
maintaining the existing order through the maintenance of traditional
legal and other forms, while at the same time creating new forms and
modifying old ones to take into account emerging and changing drives
within the community. In constantly manipulating legal and other forms
in order to regulate evolving patterns of conduct within the society, the
establishment must keep in mind Thurman Arnold's dictum: "Men be-
lieve that a society is disintegrating when it can no longer be pictured in
familiar terms.""7
The establishment, therefore, cannot remain static once new ideas and
drives gain credence in the community. During the Great Depression,
for example, a labor-capital class war could easily have developed had
the establishment remained inactive and not tried to impose some form
of order upon what Walter Lippman dubbed the "realm of disorder."
As it was, sit-in strikes and mass-picketing, riots and violence gave way
to controlled economic warfare between unions and management. This
was accomplished by devising legal forms to channel the drives of the
labor force toward a peaceful and orderly realization, first into the struc-
ture of a new union and then into ordered competition with manage-
ment." Indeed one contemporary observed astutely:
37 Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism 121 (1937).
38 See, e.g., Lerner, America as a Civilization 323-24 (1957):
In this decade something like a revolution took place in the trade-unions.. . .The New
Dealers found that they needed a strong labor movement also to give a new vitality of
bargaining and purchasing power to the depressed economy. But they could not get the
labor base they needed without in a sense creating a new frame for the trade-union
movement. That is why the New Deal became, as the quip put it at the time, a "govern-
ment in search of a labor movement."
Eventually labor responded to this stimulus by forming the C.I.O. in 1938 . . ..
The healthiest thing about this upheaval in labor was that it did much to heal the
sense of alienation of the workers. Lacking access to governmental power and a voice
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Governments often introduce novelties only very gradually. If they do make
great changes, they often act under color of old forms and symbols, long
habitually respected. Innovations appearing merely as improvements or
extensions of existing usage, or which are not felt as such, are usually
the most likely to succeed. The present Administration abhors new and
repellent symbols like "socialism," yet introduces much that savors of
socialism under the more attractive tags of individualism, justice, and a
new deal.3 9
In short, the traditional verbal forms were maintained so that the transi-
tion from laissez-faire to welfare state was accomplished without shatter-
ing the illusion of the eternal, immutable "rightways" of the American
polity.
40
There is a manifest correlation, therefore, between the effectiveness
of the rule of law and the subjective beliefs of the community. The de-
gree of force necessary to maintain order depends upon how "obvious,
right, fitting and proper" a particular law appears to be. A piece of social
legislation, for example one commanding that a minority group within
the community be afforded equal status, illustrates the point. Persuasion
by the churches on moral grounds, examples set by leaders of the estab-
lishment, high pressure propaganda disseminated by the communications
media-all proclaiming that integration better realizes the high ideals of
the society-may expedite a peaceful transition. If, however, the idea
that the particular minority is tabu is an idea basic to the orientation of
the community, it may require a battalion of paratroopers to effectuate
the minority's admittance into the majority's schools.
The failure of the eighteenth amendment is often cited to illustrate the
point that the establishment cannot legislate patterns of conduct which
conflict with the established traditions of the community. Indeed, law-
yers generally insist, for example, that the law's commands cannot be
in the big governmental decisions, they had necessarily felt like outsiders .... In this
sense the revolution in labor deflected the potential energies of a sullen working popu-
lation from more destructive revolutionary channels ....
39 Shepard, supra note 29, at 808.
40 Cf. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 142 (Harper Torchbook ed.
1962):
The capitalist process, by substituting a mere parcel of shares for the walls of and the
machines in a factory, takes the life out of the idea of property. It loosens the grip that
once was so strong-the grip in the sense of legal right and the actual ability to do as
one pleases with one's own; the grip also in the sense that the holder in the title loses the
will to fight, economically, physically, politically, for "his" factory and his control over
it, to die if necessary on its steps. And this evaporation of what we may term the mate-
rial substance of property-its visible and touchable reality-affects not only the attitude
of holders but also that of the workmen and of the public in general. Dematerialized,
defunctionalized and absentee ownership does not impress and call forth moral allegiance
as the vital form of property did. Eventually there will be "nobody" left who really
cares to stand for it-nobody within and nobody without the precincts of the big
concerns.
Schlesinger, The Vital Center 27 (1949): "In the end there will be no one ready to go down
swinging for institutions so abstract, impersonal and remote."
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divorced from the accepted patterns of community behavior. In the short
run, of course, the application of force can be increased so that a par-
ticular minor adjustment may be made. But in the long run, a broad
program maintained by force against the will of the community by its
establishment may lead to revolution.
In so far as the law is concerned, the establishment can manipulate
legal forms in any way it sees fit to achieve the ordering of patterns of
conduct within the community. The only checks upon the activity of the
establishment are its own and the society's concepts of what is natural.
Thus, the establishment in the United States might increase the size of
the Supreme Court to one hundred and fill it with "judicial activists,"
thereby openly creating a kind of House of Lords. The parliament in
England might legislate the execution without benefit of clergy of all
Roman Catholics found within the realm. The presidium of the Soviet
Union might enact prohibition and order the execution of every blue-eyed
citizen. The parliament of India might decree that henceforth untouch-
ables will be objects of public veneration. All of these acts might be said
to be "legal;" all would lead today to chaos, shattering the repose ac-
quired by thinking of the social order as natural and immutable "right-
ways."
The check, therefore, on the degree of manipulation of legal forms
allowable to the establishment is found in the self-evident truths of the
particular society. The legally possible in any community is measured by
the content of its postulational matrix, the enactments which can be
"logically" inferred therefrom as "natural," and the point beyond which
the forces available to the establishment cannot hold down a revolution.
Man being psychically dependent upon the postulational matrix of the
society-his very sense of security being dependent upon it-it repre-
sents the limits of possible action by the establishment. The "possible"
then is the limit of legal activity-the possible being at the same time the
brink of chaos.
Natural Law Demythologized into a Functional Tool. Law has its
roots in the problem of order; it is basically concerned with canalizing
the emotions of men in such a way that they can live together in relative
peace. A legal system is not the source of change: it is a flexible matrix
of vague verbal forms which can be changed to modify the flow of so-
cietal activity as permutations occur in the patterns of conduct. Changed
economics, altered demography, new ideas about politics-these are the
roots of change. The legal system is merely a set of verbal directional sig-
nals manipulated by judges and legislators bent upon regulating these
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drives in order to maintain orderly development within a dynamic so-
ciety. How change should be channeled and in what direction it should
be deflected, if not directed, is the policy problem of the manipulators
and, to the extent that they can channel change in directions of their own
choosing, the manipulators are actively engaged in affecting the evolution
of society. Whether the manipulators can direct the course of change, or
whether they must be content merely to construct new rules designed to
introduce order into the new situation depends upon how strongly the
populace at large are bent upon achieving any new desired goal.
The factor of the "possible" is dependent upon the exigencies of the
moment; the stability of the society is a variable and the content of the
self-evident truths defining the society's sacrosanct beliefs is culturally
relative. There is, however, a more traditional limiting factor thought to
be operative upon the establishment's choice of expedients. These are
the hard-core "natural laws" revealed by recent anthropological investi-
gations. Some control of killings, some provision for personal property,
and some regulation of sexual conduct, relative in detail but universal in
their minimal rudiments, are an apparent sine qua non of order. That is,
certain rudimentary rules do exist. The killing of at least certain persons
is thought of as "murder" and is said to be wrong, certain incest rela-
tionships are recognized and are tabu, and the right to possess at least
a few personal items is recognized. 41
The apparent difficulty arises when persons begin to speak about this
rudimentary order and begin to verbalize and transmit it. Natural
law is often summarized as follows: (1) Murder violates the natural law;
(2) Men have a right to own personal property; and (3) Incestuous
relationships violate the law of nature. Once formulated in this fashion,
however, the natural law at once engenders terrific argument. Some per-
sons will see in these statements the distillation of man's wisdom. Others
will see in them so much pious humbug, because they are at once able to
cite, for example, innumerable killings countenanced by society or mar-
riages countenanced in one society and condemned as incest in another.
In fact, the entire argument is a waste of effort, because the propositional
summary of the natural law in abbreviated form is neither true nor false,
the summaries being collections of propositional functions so fraught
with variables as to be empirically meaningless. Such statements, how-
41 Mead, "Some Anthropological Considerations Concerning Natural Law," 6 Natural
L.F. 51, 53 (1961):
Effective use of case studies from primitive cultures requires a recognition that no matter
how primitive the people under discussion are, rules concerning the sacredness of life
(under some circumstances), rules concerning the prohibition of incest in the primary
familial relationships in most circumstances, and rules governing an individual's rights
over some differentiated physical or cultural items will be found.
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ever, may be converted into true or false propositions in two ways. First,
with adequate particularity a true description of the basic ordering prin-
ciples of a given society can be stated, a statement which can be empir-
ically verified. Second, again with adequate particularity, a description of
the minimal order found in all societies can be made. The result of either
step, however, is to provide an almost useless body of knowledge about
society because there is an element of tautology involved, i.e., these
norms exist in all societies and are so rudimentary that they are not
"violated" in any society simply because, without them, there is no so-
ciety in the sense in which we understand it.
Apart from anthropology, however, there is an axiom generally at-
tributed to natural law systems to the effect that "An unjust law ought
not be obeyed." Over the centuries, of course, this assertion has been
the subject of constant debate. Like the postulate "social contract," this
assertion is not valuable for its empirical content but for the idea it
symbolizes. That is, it represents the idea that at some point the popula-
tion will rebel at the excesses of any establishment which has gone too far
in manipulating legal and other forms, or will rebel because the establish-
ment has tried to maintain by force forms which are no longer adequate
to order the existential situation. Properly considered it will be seen that
this assertion is simply the converse of the proposition that the "possi-
ble" is the limit of legal activity, that is, that no amount of force can
maintain order if an alien or obsolete system of ideas is imposed or
maintained upon a society by its own establishment in contravention of
existing "self-evident truths." Concomitantly, there is another axiom of
natural law to the effect that "The good ought to be done." This axiom
has existential meaning at two levels. First, it signifies that all changes in
any legal system must appear to effectuate better the ends of society, i.e.,
they must be rationalized within the context of the society's self-evident
truths. Second, it symbolizes the ever-present force of change within any
society, forces which must be channeled toward peaceful realization by
the legal system, lest if they be very strong forces, they overturn the
system. There is a correlation between the two axioms, therefore, be-
cause what is seen as good will be done, those in control of the legal
system having the choice of either channeling the drives toward the good
or being disobeyed.
For the lawyer interested in the practical order, therefore, the anthro-
pological hard-core of norms and the two functions just described repre-
sent a kind of natural law of legal science. These phenomena are not
"law" in the sense of a set of hard and fast, precise and clear rules, but
instead are working hypotheses which seem in the light of present knowl-
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edge to afford an insight into the functioning of any legal system. The
legal system must guarantee the minimal order of the hard-core norms;
if it does not, no system of law will exist, because no orientation to phe-
nomena adequate to guarantee even minimal peace of mind will exist.
Without the subjective belief that the local structure of society is natur-
al, no rightways of conduct, binding on men's minds through the aegis
of symbolic forms, will exist: where convictions of essential rightness do
not exist, law and order will not exist.
Assuming that rudimentary order exists because a viable postulational
matrix of self-evident truths is present to orient the society, the legal
order must be constantly manipulated to keep pace with" changing social,
economic, moral and political conditions. If belief in the legal system as
"the rightway" is to be maintained, however, these changes must appear
as logical developments growing out of the existing postulational matrix.
Verbal manipulation of forms-of necessarily vague forms-will be
necessary if the apparent coherence of the postulational synthesis is to
be maintained. The urge to achieve the "good" must be reflected in a
legal system which constantly is modified to channel these urges into
orderly forms. At the same time, the urge of the establishment to im-
pose what it sees as "good" on the society must be restrained lest the im-
posed "good" violate local preconceptions and lead to disrespect for the
legal system. In any system of order, therefore, the two functional axioms
attributed to the natural law are in fact counsels of moderation, distilla-
tions, so to speak, of accumulated wisdom with regard to the function-
ing of imposed systems of order.
In recent years there has been a tendency to argue that the excesses
of the Nazi regime never would have occurred had the "Natural Law"
been a viable force in German legal thinking. Such a thesis misappre-
hends the nature of society and posits a nonexistent formal, legalistic
natural law in a vacuum. This thesis omits the fact that Hitler ruled
with the consent of the society and that the society itself believed in a
system of "self-evident truths" which made possible the excesses of the
regime. The army, the courts, the bureaucracy, indeed, the people be-
lieved, for example, in the idea that the Germans were a superior race.
The other sources -of orientation, particularly the churches, seem curi-
ously to have been powerless to counteract the Nazi spell with any viable
synthesis of their own. Particularly interesting is the fact that there was
no real effort at rebellion until Hitler began to lose the war, and then
only by a rather miniscule clique. The real key to the German tragedy
is rooted in the fact that order is to be found in the traditional mental
constructs of the society and in their adequacy as a workable orientation
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to existing phenomena. The old German order was destroyed by the first
war and depression, and rather than try to modify existing forms, the
victors imposed an alien order at the same time that they created eco-
nomic conditions bound to further the chaos within the German society 2
George Kennan has aptly summarized this phenomenon:-
Man, we must remember, is a creature of habit and tradition. Much of
his ability to lead a civilized life has been the product of a long habit-
forming process, closely linked to a respect for tradition, for ancient custom
and outlook, for the accumulated wisdom of the past. More than most of
us realize, especially in this country, man has been psychically dependent
on the authority of his ancestors and on the legacy of custom and ritual
he has received from them. Consciously or unconsciously, it is to this con-
tinuity of experience from generation to generation that he has looked for
his sense of security, his inner confidence, his serenity of spirit; and it is
from precisely these qualities that the capacity for self-restraint and orderly
behavior has largely been derived. Wherever the authority of the past is
too suddenly and too drastically undermined-wherever the past ceases to
be the great and reliable reference book of human problems-wherever,
above all, the experience of the father becomes irrelevant to the trials and
searchings of the son-there the foundations of man's inner health and sta-
bility begin to crumble, insecurity and panic begin to take over, conduct
becomes erratic and aggressive.43
The German debacle, therefore, involved more than the failure of Ger-
man scholars: it involved the collapse of the entire body of subjectively
known self-evident absolutes conceived to be the source of all unity and
order in the society.44
Across wide stretches of the world today, old forms adhered to by
archaic establishments no longer reflect the aspirations of their people-
the official forms no longer orient society. "Nationalism," "democracy,"
"industrialization," "a share of the national wealth"--new ideas are
loose throughout the world: establishments unable to modify existing
forms to channel these drives toward reasonable realization will be swept
aside. Indeed:
42 See, e.g., Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920); Holborn, The
Political Collapse of Europe 28 (1951): "A peace treaty cannot create new historical forces;
it can only place the existing ones in a relationship most conducive to the maintenance of
mutual confidence and least likely to lead to future conflict." See also Churchill, The Gath-
ering Storm 10-11 (1948):
The victors imposed upon the Germans all the long-sought ideals of the liberal nations
of the West.... The Weimar Republic, with all its liberal trappings and blessings, was
regarded as an imposition of the enemy. It could not hold the loyalties or the imagination
of the German people. For a spell they sought to cling as in desperation to the aged
Marshal Hindenburg. Thereafter mighty forces were adrift; the void was open, and into
that void after a pause there strode a maniac of ferocious genius, the repository and ex-
pression of the most virulent hatreds that have ever corroded the human breast-Corporal
Hitler.
43 Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy 34 (1954).
44 The ruin of a culture, moreover, will be reflected in the degradation of its language.
For a superb analysis of the effect that the Nazi experience had on the German language,




[I]t is accepted that, in all non-industrialised countries, people are not eating
better than at the subsistence level. And they are working as people have
always had to work, from Neolithic times until our own period. Life for
the overwhelming majority of mankind has always been nasty, brutish
and short. It is so in the poor countries still.
This disparity between the rich and the poor has been noticed. It has
been noticed most acutely and not unnaturally, by the poor. Just because
they have noticed it, it won't last for long. Whatever else in the world we
know survives to the year 2000, that won't. Once the trick of getting rich is
known, as it now is, the world can't survive half rich and half poor. It's
just not on. 45
In the same way that order collapsed in Germany, traditional order
threatens to collapse in many places. What have come to be seen as
"unjust" laws will not be obeyed; what is seen as "good" will be done.
It has become simply a question of who comes forward with a new syn-
thesis, a new system of orientation which appears to people in the throes
of chaos to be adequate enough to orient them to life around them. Only
one thing appears certain: if the traditional forms of order do collapse,
the transition will not be a peaceful one. 6
For the lawyer interested in justice in its broadest sense, the function-
al axioms attributed to the natural law take on a different significance.
The "possible" may be the limits of the establishment's power, but the
scope of the possible depends upon the religion, morals, customs and
habits of the particular community. The notion that an unjust law ought
not to be obeyed here symbolizes the tension between the efforts of the
establishment to impose order and the ideas of order and justice current
in the community. In an open society the community's ideas may largely
be generated by institutions and persons other than the government, al-
45 Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution 39-40 (1959); see Olivecrona,
supra note 30, at 167:
In order really to gauge the influence of the essentially moral feelings on the law, it is
necessary to ask how far they have left their mark on the law when they have come into
sharp conflict with the self-interest of those who are in power. History gives us an
answer to this question. Self-interest has always been dominant. When have, e.g., the
rich and powerful prompted by moral reasons introduced laws aiming at a more equal
distribution of property? Never. So long as they have been able without risk to keep
their wealth to themselves, they have done it. Only under pressure from below has
another policy been adopted.
46 See Kennan, supra note 43, at 34-35:
And if the price of adjustment to rapid population growth is to cut man's ties to the
past and to catapult him violently across centuries of adjustment into some new and
unfamiliar technological stratosphere, then I am not sure that the achievement is worth
the price.
All of these circumstances seem to me to point to a single conclusion. Whatever else
we may expect from our noncommunist environment in this coming period, we should
not expect that it is always going to be marked by stability and an absence of violence.
Compare Professor Holborn's description of the view of the British Foreign Office imme-
diately after 1815: "Social and political change did not frighten British statesmen, who knew
already that the new forces could not be submerged, but could only be guided and chan-
neled." Holborn supra note 42, at 30.
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beit perhaps identified with the establishment. In a closed society the
philosophy or religion may be largely state-controlled, giving the es-
tablishment a much greater degree of control over the scope of the possi-
ble, such as in a theocracy or in a society wherein the establishment
exercises priestly powers over an ideology.
Again, the judge or the legislator will attempt to direct the activity of
the society-by making "bad acts" crimes, by creating social relation-
ships which are "good," by drafting economic plans which forward "so-
cial justice"--against the background of the axiom that the good ought
to be done. The actual content of the good, however, depends upon the
religious and philosophic concepts of the establishment and the society.
That content, moreover, derives its juices of life from nonlegal sources
-religious institutions, philosophic systems, in an open society, or
from the theologians or dialecticians in a closed one.
Regardless, therefore, whether the members of the legal system accept
as empirically valid any system of traditional natural law, a system of
demythologized natural law is a viable force in society because it orients
the community's outlook. That outlook must be taken into account by the
manipulators of legal system. If the law must appear rational and self-
evidently just in order to be viable and thereby effectively induce obedi-
ence, it must appear rational and self-evident within the context of the
society's particular orientation. The judge or legislator, therefore, is
trapped in that, regardless of his own beliefs, he must manipulate legal
forms in the context of the community's prevailing notions of what is
right. Being members of the community themselves, most of them will
not chafe under this restraint, because they cannot escape the fact that





This statement of jurisprudence is, at best, the enunciation of what
for many is a sterile Weltanschauung. The objection, of course, is self-
evident: this view excludes ultimate values from the ken of jurispru-
dence. That is, after cataloguing the myths, aims, desires and "can't
helps" of a particular society, one can only make a judgment whether its
47 T. S. Eliot grasped this in his Utopian essay, The Idea of a Christian Society 26-27
(1940):
What the rulers believed, would be less important than the beliefs to which they would
be obliged to conform. And a skeptical or indifferent statesman, working within a
Christian frame, might be more effective than a devout Christian statesman obliged to
conform to a secular frame. For he would be required to design his policy for the gov-
ernment of a Christian Society.
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legal system is expediting the achievement of those objectives. Jurispru-
dence is thereby reduced, so to speak, to a time and motion study of the
relative efficiency of various legal systems. This is only to say, however,
that the jurisprude tries to remain within the confines of the scientific
method and does not, in so far as he is humanly capable, bring to his
workbench the values of his own system.
Within his own system, of course, the jurisprude remains as free as
he ever was to pursue "justice" or "order," whether his frame of refer-
ence is theologically, ideologically or culturally determined. Here the
jurisprude can function actively in the creation of new values or the
implementation of current ones. He is free to give vent to his personal
predilections since, as we have seen, change in law turns largely on emo-
tions. Outside his own system, however, the jurisprude must content him-
self with examining states of affairs as he finds them. Once he substitutes
his own catalogue of "goods and bads" as a measuring stick of another
legal system he ceases the study of it as a question of jurisprudence and
dons the robes of self-appointed judge and jury in the moral and philo-
sophical arena. Since the techniques of maintaining order seem to have
something in common in any setting, a jurisprude is competent to assay
the relative efficiency of various systems. Until the dawn of some brave
new world, however, passing judgments on the relative goodness or
badness of the values actually being implemented by these systems,
while it may be a fair political or moral pastime, is distinctly not part of
the science of jurisprudence.
1966]
